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Book review 
amily economics is the sub-discipline in labor economics that applies 
household decision-making processes, household production, and fertility 
decisions to understanding the family. Gary Becker’s 1981 seminal Treatise 
on the Family renewed interest in the study of the economics of the household, and 
matching has become a foundational topic in family formation. Since Becker’s 
renewed interest revitalized fertility studies and the New Home Economics, various 
scholars have extended this work into matching and household formation, and few 
have advanced the research as much as Pierre-André Chiappori. Chiappori has now 
summarized his and other scholars’ work into his book Matching with Transfers: 
The Economics of Love and Marriage (2017). 
Matching is the microeconomic technique that describes the formation of 
mutually beneficial relationships between economic agents over time. Applied to 
family economics, matching describes the process by which single individuals seek 
relationships that end in successful families. Whereas search cost models allow for 
friction and the costs of acquiring information, matching models assume 
frictionless environments. Moreover, family matching models address input and 
product exchanges that are intrinsically heterogeneous, which is in contrast to 
many models that assume homogenous inputs and products. The size and structure 
of the matching market also have implications in matching models, and assuming 
similar search costs, thicker markets allow agents greater matching opportunities.    
There are three types of matching models: transferable, non-transferable, and 
imperfect transfer models. To narrow the topic, Chiappori focuses on transferable 
utility models, which is one of the main topics in the matching literature. There are 
other important motivations to study matching models and their applications to 
family economics: unitary models, collective models, and non-cooperative models.  
The unitary model’s approach is equivalent to postulating household preferences 
that are represented by a household head who makes decisions independent of 
other household member choices, prices, income, and exogenous factors. 
Collective household models recognize households consist of several individuals 
that have distinct utility functions, and household decisions are efficient in that 
their allocations are always on the Pareto frontier. Household decisions are 
efficient if they maximize a weighted sum of member utilities. Spouses disagree 
when allocating public resources or resources shared within the household, which 
leads to non-Pareto efficient intra-family allocations. Non-cooperative family 
models assume that members do not always agree and resulting decisions 
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systematically conflict. However, non-cooperative models are not common in the 
matching literature.  In all cases, the fundamental problem includes the definition 
of outcomes for each possible match.  The book carefully presents the principles of 
matching in the context of super modularity and assortativeness, matching surplus, 
and stability conditions. 
After a precise formulation of matching transfer utility models, Chiapporia 
ddresses unobservable heterogeneity models, the Choo-Siow model, and the 
econometrics of matching models.  Chiappori extends matching models to include 
pre-investment decisions, such as human capital decisions and education.  
Households are also a means of sharing risk, and intra-family risk-sharing within 
the family plays an important role, such as income and risk-sharing over the 
business cycle (Shore, 2010). Multidimensional matching models that consider the 
characteristic dimension space are then presented between potential matches.  
Approximately 50 percent of marriages in the US fail, and the matching literature 
accounts for divorce and match dissolution by modelling the decision to return to 
singlehood or recalibrate to a more preferred match. 
Matching with Transfers provides a comprehensive view for matching models 
written for the advanced undergraduate, graduate, and seasoned microeconomics 
professor or researcher who wants to remain informed of recent developments in 
the field.  The book bridges the gap between matching, family economics, and 
market applications to show how matching has broad applications across labor 
economics, law and economics, contract theory, and industrial economics.  Written 
as an objective coverage of matching within family economics, it provides the 
theoretical framework to evaluate how couples match with helpful, illustrative 
examples in each chapter, and useful section summaries.  With Matching with 
Transfers, Chiaporri provides a valuable contribution and summary of the matching 
and family economics literature. 
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